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A B S T R A C T
This paper estimates the role of country-variety comparative advantage in the decision to offshore assembly of
more than 2000 models of 197 car brands headquartered in 23 countries. While offshoring in the car industry has
risen from 2000 to 2016, the top five offshoring brands account for half the car assembly relocated to low-wage
countries. We show that the decision to offshore a particular car model depends on two types of cost (dis)
advantage of the home country relative to foreign locations. The first type, the assembly costs common to all
models, is estimated via a structural triadic gravity equation. The second effect, model-level comparative ad-
vantage, is an interaction between proxies for the model’s skill and capital intensity and headquarter country’s
abundance in these factors.
1. Introduction
Concern over the effects of offshoring on workers motivates a large
body of empirical research. A prominent recent example is Pierce and
Schott (2016), who attribute a large part of the decline in US manu-
facturing employment to the reallocation of production to China by US
firms. They point out that the biggest increase in Chinese exports to the
US following WTO accession was for foreign affiliates. Furthermore,
WTO accession boosted the number of related-party import transaction
in US imports. Hummels et al. (2018) survey the empirical literature
about offshoring effects, and report substantial impacts of offshoring on
rich countries’ labor markets, regarding both employment and wage
inequality.
Which products are most vulnerable to the offshoring threat? While
Blinder (2006) contends that “virtually all [manufacturing] jobs were
potentially moveable offshore’,” Hanson (2015) finds that in reality
even within manufacturing, offshoring is confined to a handful of sec-
tors. In this paper we zoom in on one of those sectors, the car industry,
to examine the country and variety-level characteristics that make
offshoring more likely. One unsurprising factor promoting offshoring is
sectoral cost competitiveness of the potential offshoring country. A
second key factor is variety-level misfit between product factor in-
tensities and country factor abundances. We investigate these hy-
potheses, exploiting exceptionally detailed data from the car industry.
Car makers have a long history of assembly in foreign countries:
Ford of Canada began manufacturing operations in 1904. For the most
part, the car industry, like other industries, has moved production
abroad to obtain better access to foreign customers.1 Recently, there has
been a rise in use of foreign assembly to serve markets other than just
the host country. In 2010, with unions complaining that Renault had
moved three quarters of its car production outside of France, then
president Sarkozy summoned Renault’s CEO, Carlos Ghosn, to the
Elysée Palace “to explain the carmaker’s strategy.” He was reportedly
told to retain production of the Clio for the French market in France,
rather than move it to the Renault plant in Turkey. Six years later 64%
of the new generation Clios sold in France were produced in Turkey
with the remainder in France. In March 2014 Porsche announced that it
would move production of the Cayenne SUV from Germany to Slovakia.
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This would mark the first time that Porsches would be assembled in a
poorer country than Germany.
Stories such as these suggest a major change in the pattern of auto
assembly is under way. To what extent will auto production go the way
of clothing and consumer electronics and migrate to less developed
countries? This paper quantitatively investigates the state of offshoring
in the passenger car industry. We propose two ways to measure the
amount of offshoring of assembly and show that it is not growing as
much as the anecdotes above suggest. Furthermore, offshoring for the
home market is highly heterogeneous: the top five offshoring brands
account for half of the cars made abroad and sold in the brands’ home
market.
To explain the large observed variation in offshoring, we examine
the country- and model-level determinants of the decision to assemble a
particular model in a lower wage country. Our aim is to understand
why offshoring takes place and in particular which firms find it at-
tractive. The results we obtain support a simple comparative advantage
model of offshoring. Firms based in countries that have relatively high
assembly costs are more likely to offshore in general and the most likely
models to be offshored are the less expensive cars of brands based in
high income countries. We interpret price as a proxy for the skill and
capital intensity of the model and per capita income as a proxy for
abundance in the corresponding factors of production.
Why is offshoring in the car industry of particular interest? First of
all, the car industry is large and considered important by government
policy makers. Passenger cars are the largest expenditure category
among goods.2 Industry associations in the European Union (EU) and
United States (US) report very large employment shares for the broadly
defined automotive sector. Including parts and other related activities,
it accounts for 5.8% of the total employed population of the EU and
nearly 5% of US employment. Car makers were deemed sufficiently
important to receive $US 81 bn under both the Bush and Obama ad-
ministrations. In January 2017, Donald Trump threatened General
Motors with border taxes if it continued to make Chevrolet Cruzes in-
tended for the US market in Mexico.
A second compelling reason to study offshoring in the car industry is
the existence of extraordinarily rich data. IHS Markit, an automotive
consultancy, provides a nearly exhaustive account where cars are made
and then sold. Comparable data do not appear to be available on a
worldwide basis for any other sector of the economy. Most government-
provided data sets are restricted to parent firms or affiliates based in a
single reporting country. IHS tracks the factories where over 2000
models are assembled by nearly all manufacturers and brands. The
data, running from 2000 to 2016, shows annual flows at the level of
individual models identifying location of assembly and country of sale
(the data are based in part on new car registrations). Because we can
map the origins of each brand back to a headquarters country (which
we designate as the brand’s “home”), we capture the three essential
locations that form part of our criteria for offshoring: where each brand
makes the cars it sells in its brand home and other markets. Some im-
portant dimensions of the data include the following:
• 2444 local nameplates for 2026 “global nameplates” (models)
identified by the makers.• For each model we also know the start and end year of each “pro-
gram” (version of the model).• The data also distinguishes the size and function of the model.• For about 1000 models and 28 countries (contained in a second
module offered by IHS Markit), we have destination-specific sales
price information.• 197 brands from 23 different brand homes.• 76 different markets (countries that record brand/origin).
• 52 different assembly countries (almost all world production).
Using the auto data set, we conduct three main empirical exercises.
The first step quantifies the magnitude and direction of offshoring to
this date. By offshoring we mean the relocation of production intended
for a given market to new assembly sites. Our narrow definition of
offshoring focuses on the home market of the brand. The narrow defi-
nition of offshoring thus removes all relocation of production to get
closer to foreign customers.3 Our broad definition considers all as-
sembly outside the brand’s home country to be offshoring. In both
cases, we define the home country to be the place where the head-
quarters of the brand is located. In cases such as Volvo where head-
quarters functions are mixed between countries (Sweden and China),
the home country is defined based on where the brand was founded
(Sweden). By direction, we distinguish “downward” offshoring to lower
income countries from “flat” and “upward” offshoring to other coun-
tries at similar or higher income levels. Our threshold for flat is for the
producing country per-capita income to be no more than 20% above or
below the per capita income of the brand home.
After establishing that offshoring to serve the home market remains
small and is mainly carried out by a small number of brands, we in-
vestigate the determinants of the decision to offshore all or part of
the production of a car model. Drawing elements from
Dornbusch et al. (1980) and Feenstra and Hanson (1997) we develop a
simple model of the variety-level decision to offshore. The model is
deliberately parsimonious, abstracting from dynamic aspects such as
switching costs and the hysteresis they would induce. Our purpose is to
formalize in a straightforward way the idea that products which are
misfits in the brand’s home market are more like to be offshored. Our
notion of “misfit” is a skill-intensive car model that is produced in a
country where skilled workers are relatively scarce and hence relatively
highly paid.
In addition to variety-level comparative advantage, a second driver
of the decision to offshore is the general cost advantage of the home
country in car assembly. To obtain the country-specific “assembly ad-
vantage” term, we first estimate a specification of multinational pro-
duction (MP) flows derived from Arkolakis et al. (2018). This specifi-
cation has origin-year and brand-destination-year fixed effects as well
as measures of frictions between assembly country and market as well
as headquarter and assembly country. Our paper is the first to estimate
the triadic gravity regression for multinational production using data
with the appropriate dimensions. In the model, the origin-year fixed
effects are proportional to the ratio of worker productivity to their
wages.
Our final exercise is to estimate a fractional logit on the share of
production that is offshored at the model level. One previous study has
also sought to identify the characteristics of vehicles that makes them
more susceptible to offshoring: McCalman and Spearot (2013) ex-
amined the Post-NAFTA expansion of capacity to produce light trucks in
Mexico. They found that US firms “offshored varieties that were older
and less complex to produce.” We compare our worldwide car results to
their North American trucking results.
The remainder of the paper consists of five sections. Section 2
documents the changes that occurred in worldwide production of cars
over the 2000–2016 period. Section 3 then specifies our definitions of
offshoring, and quantifies its extent and patterns over time and space.
Our modeling of the offshoring decision and estimating equation are
described in Section 4. The measurement of the different covariates
involved in the offshoring regression is contained in Section 5, and
Section 6 provides our estimates of the decision to produce their models
in a country where costs are lower than at home.
2 They account for 4% of personal consumption expenditures in the United
States.
3 This motive for production abroad is also referred to as “tariff-jumping”
though tariffs are often not the main trade cost.
K. Head and T. Mayer Journal of The Japanese and International Economies 52 (2019) 90–105
91
2. Emerging economies in the auto assembly sector
In this section we chart the changes in the location of passenger car
production that have occurred from 2000 to 2016. We look at three
specific cases of “emerging market” economies that assemble growing
shares of the world’s cars.
We begin by noting that total car production in the OECD in 2016 is
41.78 million units, only 9% higher than in 2000. It increased some-
what in the lead-up to the 2008 crisis, then fell sharply, before stabi-
lizing at the old level in 2013 and has been growing slowly since then.
On the other hand, non-OECD production has risen every year since
2000, cumulating a more than six-fold increase from 2000 to 2016.
Figs. 1 and 2 zoom in on the changing nature of production in three
economic areas that have experienced impressive growth in their shares
of world production: China, Eastern Europe (Poland, the Czech Re-
public, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria), and
Mexico.
The case of China, shown in Fig. 1 is the most straightforward to
describe. There, production growth has matched demand growth al-
most exactly one for one until purchases outstripped production in
2010 and China became a small net importer. Foreign brands have
gradually moved ahead of Chinese brands. Initially China had a very
large number of very small brands. In 2000 its share or world brands
was 9.2 times higher than its share of world production. Over the
following 16 years the Chinese brands expanded the scale of produc-
tion. By 2016 the brand to production share ratio fell to 1.4. Chinese
brands remain on the small side and based on the experience of the
traditional producers, we may expect a “shake-out” to occur in the
future.
China may one day replicate in car assembly its success in areas like
electronics assembly where it is already the “workshop of the world.”
However there is no sign of this in the data yet. One limitation China
faces is that it has few free trade agreements with major markets. Our
regression analysis in Section 5.1 finds that trade agreements and tariff
rates have large effects.
Contrasting with the Chinese case, Fig. 2 shows that Eastern Europe
and Mexico have experienced sluggish growth in domestic demand,
while hosting a share of world production that grows steadily over time
starting in 2004. In both cases, net exports grow substantially over the
period as a result. This pattern is particularly pronounced for Eastern
European countries who joined the European Union. Since 2004 exports
of foreign brands (mainly from Western Europe) have boomed.
Two cases provide a good illustration of the migration of assembly
to Eastern and Central Europe. Starting in the 1970s, an assembly
factory in Tychy assembled a Polish version of the Fiat 126. Fiat pur-
chased the plant in 1992 when it was privatized. Recently, Fiat allo-
cated to the Tychy factory the new and highly successful 500 model.
Tychy assembled almost as many cars as Fiat’s five biggest plants in
Fig. 1. The growth of China.
Fig. 2. The growth of the periphery.
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Italy with one third the workers each earning one third the pay.4 Tychy
operates 24 h per day, six days per week, whereas Fiat’s Italian plants
operated at 40% capacity utilization in 2012.
Renault’s Revoz plant in Novo Mesto, Slovenia provides a somewhat
similar story. It began as a joint venture in the 1980s. The plan was to
focus on selling cheap Renaults in the Yugoslav market. That plan had
to be altered when Yugoslavia fell apart. Slovenia emerged instead as
an offshoring and exporting platform.
Mexico (which has no local brand), also benefits from a regional
trade agreement. NAFTA was signed in 1993, but its tariff reductions
were phased in over the next decade. We unfortunately lack data before
2000 so we miss most of the period where the NAFTA tariff cuts were
being phased in. The reasons behind the 2004 turnaround and sub-
sequent boom in Mexico’s net exports shown in Fig. 2(b) are unclear.
The picture that emerges from Fig. 2 is one of two major historical
production bases (North America and Western Europe) offshoring part
of their car assembly to their respective low-cost “peripheries” (Mexico
for the US brands and Eastern Europe for the European brands). We
now try to quantify the offshoring movement in a more global and
systematic way.
3. Measuring offshoring
The data set we have allows us to track the production of individual
products. We can distinguish horizontal (market-seeking) activities
from offshoring because we know the location of assembly and also
where the cars are sold for each model. Another great advantage of our
data is to be able to follow a specific variety over time, and therefore
keep track of changes in the location of production with potential
transfer to low cost countries.
To measure offshoring we must first define it. Feenstra (2004) de-
fines offshoring as the “transfer of production overseas, whether it is
done within or outside the firm.” We focus on single task or activity, the
assembly of passenger cars. Our data has no information on the sources
of components so this will not be a paper about “slicing the value chain”
except in the sense of separating final assembly from design and dis-
tribution. The question begged by Feenstra’s definition is when should
we consider overseas production to be transferred? It seems like the
essential condition should be that but for this increase in offshore pro-
duction, there would have been no corresponding reduction in home-
country production.
We work with two definitions of offshoring. Our first definition is
that a car is considered offshored if it is consumed in the home country but
assembled in a different country. This approach excludes offshore pro-
duction that is aimed at serving the host country’s market, with the
general presumption that much or all of those sales would not be served
by the brand if it did not produce locally. Such production therefore has
small or no impact on domestic workers. This version of offshoring
focuses on the home country, which is the only market firms are
guaranteed to be able to serve without facing tariff or non-tariff bar-
riers. “Narrow” offshoring refers to cars assembled overseas but sold in
the home market.5 This seems to correspond to what political leaders
have in mind when talking about offshoring. We reproduce a quote by
French president’s Chief of Staff, made public at a time when the French
government was negotiating with Renault’s CEO Carlos Ghosn about
the potential re-location of a new model’s (Clio 4) assembly in Turkey:
“Ghosn said very clearly that the Clio 4s corresponding to the French
market will be made in France... You can’t ask Renault to make cars
for Turkey in France, which would mean not selling any more cars in
Turkey.” (Claude Guéant, Sarkozy Chief of Staff, January, 18, 2010)
The narrow definition of offshoring is the appropriate one if most
overseas production for foreign markets would have to be produced in
those markets. Thus it would not substitute for domestic employment.
An alternative definition, takes a quite opposite view, emphasizing
substitution between domestic and foreign employment, regardless of
the final market. From a worker perspective, Renault Clios made in
Turkey are Clios not made in France—no matter who ultimately buys
them. Consequently, our “broad” definition of offshoring is production
outside the brand home divided by the brandâ;;s production in all lo-
cations.6 The right definition depends on the cross-substitution possi-
bilities, which are difficult to assess ex ante. Therefore, our approach is
to “bracket” the actual extent of offshoring with these 2 admittedly
extreme definitions.
Narrow offshoring selects a home where the brand was historically
produced and divides imports by total consumption. Broad offshoring
looks at the total production outside of the brand home base. This
“brand home” country is therefore an essential concept in our defini-
tions of offshoring. We choose to define “home” as the country where
the brand is headquartered or where it was founded.
The case of the Renault Twingo illustrates some of the important
issues involved in defining offshoring. Table 1 displays sales of that
model in the HQ country and in the only 4 markets that are served by
one of the Latin American plants. For almost all markets, this model was
sourced entirely from the Flins factory near Paris until 2007. The ex-
ceptions were assembly in Colombia and Uruguay for local sales
(“horizontal MP” in the taxonomy of Ramondo and Rodríguez-
Clare, 2013). In 2007, with the launch of a new version (II), Twingo
production in France was terminated and all (new) Twingo production
was concentrated in Slovenia to be exported to most destinations (in-
cluding France).7 Again, the exception was a small amount of produc-
tion for the version I in Colombia, mainly for the local market, but with
a few cars shipped to neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela (“export
platform MP”). All Twingo cars sold in France since 2008 were pro-
duced in Novo Mesto, Slovenia. Under the narrow definition, this car
switch from 0 to 100% offshored in 2008. Under the broad definition,
the pivotal year involved a change from a small positive number (the
local sales in Latin America) to 100%. The offshoring rate remained
100% under both definitions with the third generation of Twingo
started in 2014, and entirely concentrated in the Slovenian plant
(selling in 29 countries).
Fig. 3 depicts trends in offshoring based on the two different defi-
nitions of offshoring and three different offshoring destinations. Panel
(a) is based on the narrow definition, while panel (b) is for the broad
definition. The direction of offshoring will be considered “up” for im-
ports from countries that have per capita incomes that are 20% higher
than the home country. Offshoring “down” corresponds to imports from
countries 20% poorer than the home. “Flat” offshoring refers to similar
average income levels. We use market exchange rates in each case since
we are aiming at comparing wages, rather than standards of living.8 We
average incomes from 2000 to 2016 so as to prevent offshoring in a
given country from shifting from being down to flat if, say the income
of the country grew substantially during the period.9 The relative
nature of this definition implies that assembly in a well-to-do country
4 Facts taken from Rattner article in Financial Times, October 4, 2012.
5 Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) refer to this as “pure vertical MP” but
the “vertical” terminology would be confusing in this context since we only
consider one stage of production (assembly). Also, offshoring has become the
standard term in policy discussions.
6 This includes vertical, horizontal and export platform MP. We thank Peter
Neary for suggesting us that we should consider export platform production in
our definitions of offshoring.
7 The Flins factory continued to produce the Clio but production at the factory
in 2016 was only a quarter of its 2000 level.
8 We considered using data on manufacturing wages in the transport equip-
ment sector but the loss of countries due to missing data did not seem like a
good trade-off given that we are dividing countries into coarse categories.
9 This prevents sudden jumps in offshoring that are not related to actual
changes in production but only to country classification.
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like Belgium can be considered offshoring down if, as in the case of
Volvo, the brand home is more than 20% higher income.
The picture from Fig. 3 is that in narrow offshoring remains globally
a limited phenomenon, since the part of it that concerns low cost lo-
cations peaks at 10% of home demand. However, offshoring “down” is
now twice as high (8%) as it was in 2000, contrasting sharply with the
declinging trends for both offshoring “up” and of offshoring “flat.” The
broad offshoring shares are uniformly higher than the corresponding
narrow shares, as was to be expected from the inclusion of all kinds of
MP (vertical, horizontal and export platform) under that approach.
Fig. 4 shows that the patterns we see at the global level for off-
shoring are not replicated evenly across the main brand homes. The
figure applies the same vertical range (0–50%) to each country’s level of
narrow offshoring so as to facilitate comparisons. The top row shows
the two large countries whose increase in offshoring from lower income
countries was most pronounced, France and Italy. The United States
and Germany exhibit quite different patterns. While the low cost lo-
cations are also attracting production of US and German brands, the
rate of progress is much more modest. The extraordinary level of “flat”
offshoring of US brands is distinctive and almost entirely attributable to
the long history of market integration with Canada. The UK and Japan,
are at the other extreme from France and Italy, with extremely little
narrow offshoring. While this is perhaps not so surprising for UK
brands, consisting mainly of luxury and sports cars, it is quite striking
for Japanese mass-oriented car producers.
The broad definition of offshoring does not change the picture
dramatically for France and Italy (Fig. 5). Both countries have seen a
very impressive rise in the share of production in poorer countries for
cars aimed at serving both the domestic and foreign consumers. The
picture for the USA is more radically changed suggesting that when
serving third markets, US brands tend to use more low-cost production
facilities (often local) than when serving the domestic market. Off-
shoring of US cars in Canada seems to be mainly intended to serve the
US market. The UK remains an exception with very low levels of broad
offshoring. However, the share of Japan-brand cars produced in poorer
countries has risen from 10% to 40%. Fig. 6 shows that even within a
brand home like France, the country that shows the most marked trend
towards offshoring, there has been remarkable heterogeneity across the
brands in terms of their expansion of narrow offshoring. All three
brands have dramatically increased sourcing from poorer countries.
Table 1
The Twingo example.
Market: FRA COL URY VEN ECU
Plant: Flins Novo Mesto Medellin Novo Mesto Montevideo Medellin Medellin
Version: I II III I II I I I
2000 76622 1749 578
2001 78891 1927 476
2002 67588 3508
2003 53146 4503
2004 47699 5168
2005 45594 7456
2006 38133 9937 2666 53
2007 8525 43618 10069 3377 34
2008 65333 6660 960
2009 107456 7756 137 25
2010 92183 5565
2011 68236 6780 23
2012 39697 3273
2013 39032 277
2014 15824 26195 134
2015 45425 2
2016 40796
Note: The figures reported are total sales. Over the whole period, this model is sold by Renault in 46 different markets and produced in 4 different plants: Flins in
France, Novo Mesto in Slovenia, Medellin in Colombia, and Montevideo in Uruguay (which stopped production in 2002). All other countries where that car is
continuously sold (Germany, Italy, etc.) exhibit the same sourcing pattern as for cars sold in France.
Fig. 3. Offshoring by income level of source country, narrow (solid) and broad (dashed) definitions.
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However, Renault’s rise from near 0 to 60% offshoring in just 6 years
(2003–2009) is the most spectacular boom in narrow offshoring we
have seen. The Novo Mesto, Slovenia and Bursa, Turkey plants were the
primary beneficiaries of this massive reallocation of assembly activity.
Fig. 7 shows that the brand heterogeneity exhibited in France is part
of a broader phenomena in which just five top brands account for 50%
of the world’s offshoring. This figure holds for the narrow definition of
offshoring in 2016. While these five brands are all large, their global
share of sales in 2016 is just 22%. Concentration of offshoring was even
more impressive in the early 2000s, when the top five offshoring brands
represented 76% of world (narrow) offshoring (and 26% of world
production). These figures suggest that brand heterogeneity must be
examined if one is to understand the rise in offshoring. One might
question our insistence on brands at this point. Is it not really just firm
heterogeneity? The case of Fiat is our best reply since both Ferrari and
Maserati are owned by Fiat but neither brand offshores production.
Similarly, within our data range, of the Volkswagen-owned brands
(Audi, Bugatti, Porsche, Seat, Skoda, etc.), only VW itself engages in
significant offshoring.
We summarize offshoring trends as follows: Offshored cars from
poorer—yet OECD—countries have small market shares at home, but
have doubled from four to eight percent. Downward offshoring exceeds
Fig. 4. Offshoring (narrow) in six major brand homes.
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offshoring from similar-income sources. Broad definition offshoring is
much larger but it includes horizontal (market-seeking) MP that prob-
ably does not substitute much for home production. The China story in
cars is completely different from iPhones. There is massive hetero-
geneity in offshoring: Similar countries and firms offshore in vastly
different amounts. The “few” (top 5 brands) account for the majority of
offshoring.
4. Comparative advantage and the offshoring decision
What factors drive offshoring? Why are some models offshored and
others not? McCalman and Spearot (2013) study US truck makers off-
shoring to Mexico. Their results point to low complexity, older vintages,
and small scale as variables associated with higher shares of trucks
sourced from Mexican factories. With only one outsourcing country in
their data set, they obviously could not investigate the role of head-
quarter country attributes. On the other hand, since our data contains
23 HQ countries and 50 assembly countries, we are able to examine the
roles of country and country-model interactions in determining com-
parative advantage.
To explain why some models are offshored but others are not, we
need a theory and measurement of model-level comparative advantage.
Fig. 5. Offshoring (broad) in six major brand homes.
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For this exercise, we employ a simple two-country model of a home
country that potentially offshores assembly of a car model to a lower
income foreign country. When necessary to avoid confusion between
the two uses of the term model, we will refer to car models as varieties.
Our model of the offshoring decision takes its inspiration from the
seminal papers of Dornbusch et al. (1980), Feenstra and Hanson (1997),
and Schott (2004). We hypothesize that model m-level comparative
advantage of country i is determined by the interaction of i development
level and m skill-intensity.
Let costs of domestic production for a model m be given by a nested
Cobb-Douglas that takes the following form
=c m w w p m( ) ( ) exp( ( )),Hz m L z m I( ) 1 ( ) 1 (1)
where z(m) is the cost share parameter for high-skilled workers, paid
wH, while the low skilled ones are paid wL. Importantly, those cost
shares can vary by model. Costs comprise labor with share β and a
basket of intermediate inputs priced pI and used with a constant share
1 . There is also a random term ϵ(m) that captures the (mis-)match
between the precise model m and the domestic country in terms of
overall productive efficiency. In log terms,
= + + ++c m z m w z m w pmln ( ) ln ( ) ln (1 ( )) ln (1 )ln( ). H L I (2)
Car manufacturers can also resort to a different production location
than the domestic market, i.e. offshore to a country where all variables
are superscripted with an asterisk, and ship back to home the assembled
cars, with cost τ. There is also an additional cost for operating a factory
abroad by the manufacturer denoted γ. Both τ and γ take the iceberg
form. Costs in the case of offshoring are given by
= + + ++ +c m z m w z m w pmln * ( ) ln * ( ) ln * (1 ( )) ln * (1 )ln *ln( ) *( ). H L I (3)
It is convenient to introduce notation ω and κ, such that
+ +
+ + +( )
( ) w p
w p
ln and ln ln (1 )ln ,
* ln and * ln * ln * (1 )ln * ln( ).
w
w L I
w
w L I
*
*
H
L
H
L
The choice to offshore will be driven by cost minimization, such that
= <= + + < + += < +
c m c m
z m m z m m
m m z m
Prob(offshoring) Prob[ln *( ) ln ( )]
Prob[ * ( ) * *( ) ( ) ( )]
Prob[ *( ) ( ) * ( ) ( *)].
(4)
Assuming that m m*( ) ( ) is distributed logistically (which will be the
case if each of those terms is distributed Gumbel) gives immediately a
closed form formula for this probability of offshoring:
Fig. 6. Brand-level differences in offshoring within France.
Fig. 7. A few firms account for most offshoring from low-wage countries.
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= += + z m xeProb(offshoring) [ * ( )( *)], with ( )(1 ) .x 1 (5)
There are two variables in Eq. (5) that affect the propensity to off-
shore. The first, *, is the additional cost needed to assemble cars
(to be delivered to the domestic consumer) in the home country of the
brand compared to alternative assembly locations. Our regressions
will use the fixed effect of country i as a production site from our
gravity equation (described in next section), together with estimated
frictions γ and τ as proxies for *. The second variable in (5) is an
interaction between skill intensity, z(m), and the relative costs of
skilled and unskilled labor compared to the rest of world, *. The
latter factor (captured empirically with the level of development of
the HQ country) make offshoring more likely for models that in-
tensively use skilled labor. Intuitively, a rich country where the re-
lative wage of skilled labor is low will tend to offshore models with
low z. We refer to low z models assembled in skill-abundant countries
as “misfits.” On the contrary, rich countries will keep at home the
models for which they have a comparative advantage, i.e. the ones
that use skilled labor intensively. Empirically, we expect the com-
bined skill and capital intensity of a model to be well proxied by its
relative price. As we describe in the next section, we must purge the
prices of each model of market-level determinants (such as sales
taxes).
5. The proxies for assembly costs and skill intensity
The next two subsections explain how we estimate our proxies for
*, the cost disadvantage of the home country in assembly, and
z m( )( *), the product-level comparative advantage misfit term.
5.1. Triadic gravity estimates of assembly costs
First, we need to estimate cost advantage in assembly of each car-
producing nation. To do so, we take an equation from the multinational
production model by Arkolakis et al. (2018), hereafter ARRY, to the
data. The US-source data they use lacks the variation needed to esti-
mate the two sets of frictions present in this equation. We therefore
believe this is the first empirical estimate of what we will call the
“triadic gravity” equation. The triad in question is
1. The HQ country, denoted i,
2. The final assembly location, denoted ℓ,
3. The country in which the car is sold, denoted n.
Let Xiℓnt/Xnt denote the market share obtained by ℓ-made cars of i-
based brands in n and year t. ARRY’s Eq. (7) delivers this share as the
product of two factors:
=X
X
,i nt
nt
i nt int
E
where ψiℓnt is the probability that country ℓ is the minimum-cost loca-
tion for a firm from i serving market n in t, and intE is the share of n’s
expenditures spent on firms from i. We can leave intE unspecified here
because it is captured by a fixed effect in the empirical implementation
of the triadic gravity.
The costs associated with delivering a car designed in i and pro-
duced in ℓ to consumers in n depend on marginal production costs
denoted cℓt, costs τℓnt for shipping products from ℓ to n, and costs γiℓt for
i-based transferring HQ inputs to factories in ℓ.10 The aggregation of
model-specific unit cost functions such as Eq. (1) has not yet been
solved in the literature.11 To make headway, we will therefore work
with an approximation involving a representative variety so that we can
still obtain aggregate flow shares of the form derived by
Arkolakis et al. (2018) in their Lemma 1. The unit costs in country ℓ for
that representative model are
=c w w p( ) ,t t H tz L tz It1 1 (6)
There are also unobserved productivity shocks, distributed multivariate
Pareto with parameters θ and ρ.12 The probability i-based firms serving
n choose ℓ as supplier is
= c
c
[( ) ]
[( ) ]
.i nt
t nt i t
k kt knt ikt
1
1
1
1 (7)
We can therefore express market shares as a function of two frictions
and two sets of fixed effects:
= + +X
X
exp FEA FES
1
(ln ln )i nt
nt
t int n i t
The assembly (A) and sales (S) fixed effects (FE) have structural inter-
pretations with,
= cFEA
1
lnt t
= cFES ln (1 ) ln ( ) .int intE
k
kt kn ikt
1
We refer to FEAℓt as the cost advantage in this industry. The next step is
to parameterize the two frictions, τℓnt between factory and buyer, γiℓt
between HQ and factory. Let D represent the vector of five common
friction determinants
• Home, a dummy set to one for = n (“tau” effects) and =i n
(“gamma” effects) can be thought of as the reverse of a border effect.
We also interact the home dummy with indicators for whether the
assembly country is a member of the OECD or, if not, is an LDC.• Distance measures the great-circle physical separation between the
main cities (weighted by population) in the assembly and market or
assembly and headquarters countries.• Contiguity: an indicator for country pairs that share a land border.• A dummy for regional trade agreements (RTAs) such as NAFTA and
the European Union.• Applied tariffs: +ln(1 tariff )nt where tariffℓnt is the tariff rate re-
levant when exporting cars from ℓ to n and +ln(1 tariff )i with
tariffiℓt being an average of tariffs paid when importing car parts in ℓ
from HQ country i.
Note that the two last frictions are policy variables that vary over
time unlike the geography frictions.
Denoting the corresponding vector of marginal costs for trade and
production as gT and gP, trade and multinational production frictions
are given by
= =D g D gexp( ), exp( )nt nt T i t i t P
The triadic gravity estimating equation is therefore obtained by sub-
stituting the frictions terms for τ and γ, yielding
10 Our model does not consider dynamic issues involving switching costs and
uncertainty. These are likely to be important but a first step is to consider the
most basic economic mechanisms in a static setting.
11 The problem is that heterogeneity in z(m) is analogous to random coeffi-
cients in a differentiated products demand model. Since heterogeneity cannot
be isolated into a multiplicative shock, there is no closed form for the aggregate
probability ψiℓn.
12 Tintelnot (2017) and Head and Mayer (2019) obtain an observationally
equivalent ψiℓn by assuming Type 1 Extreme Value productivity shocks.
K. Head and T. Mayer Journal of The Japanese and International Economies 52 (2019) 90–105
98
= +X
X
D g D gexp FEA FES
1 1
i nt
nt
t int nt
T
i t
P
We use quantity shares Qiℓnt/Qnt, with Qnt≡∑i∑ℓQiℓnt in place of un-
observed value market shares Xiℓn/Xn. Acknowledging unobserved/im-
perfectly measured frictions determinants, the moment condition we
want to estimate is
= + + +Q
Q
D g D gexp[FEA FES ]i nt
nt
t int nt
T
i t
P
(8)
where the g coefficients multiply g by /(1 ).
Comparing this to ARRY equation (29), we see that their specifi-
cation features iℓ fixed effects which absorb γiℓ. Because cℓ and γiℓ enter
multiplicatively in the numerator of (7), a structural iℓ fixed effect is
separable into ℓ terms and γiℓ if one is willing to parameterize γiℓ.
However, ARRY only have data on exports for affiliates from one origin,
the USA, courtesy of the BEA (ARRY’s empirical application uses cross-
sectional data for 1999, hence the omission of index t in this para-
graph). This data limitation implies that γiℓ is not identified in the
presence of ℓ fixed effects.
A further advantage of our dataset concerns destination markets n.
BEA data used by ARRY have just five specified destinations: USA, CAN,
JPN, GBR, and a 14-country European Union composite. Our estimation
includes 21 HQ countries, 52 producing, and 76 consuming countries.13
Thus we have the requisite HQ-assembly variation to identify γiℓ and
much more variation for estimating the effects of the five determinants
of τℓn. It should be noted, however that a large fraction (73%) of the
final estimating sample has =Q 0i n .
Last, our data has a substantial panel nature (we cover the period
from 2000 to 2016). This allows part of the identification on frictions to
come from the within dimension for the RTA and tariff variables. It also
allows for the cost advantage of country ℓ in the assembly of cars to vary
over time, accounting for differences in how productivity, wages, land
prices, etc. change over time across countries.
Taking triadic gravity to the data requires an error term. If we as-
sumed a multiplicative error term distributed as a homoskedastic log-
normal then we could take logs and estimate the MLE via OLS.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that we should prefer estima-
tors that are consistent under weaker assumptions on the error term,
such as the Poisson pseudo-MLE (PPML). This estimator has the addi-
tional advantage of keeping the zeros in the regression. We estimate
this condition using PPML with market shares as the dependent vari-
able. Our estimator is equivalent to the multinomial pseudo-MLE pro-
posed by Eaton et al. (2013).14
Table 2 provides results of our triadic gravity regression. The dis-
play is organized such that the first column shows results related to τℓn,
while the second shows the ones for γiℓ, all variables being included in
the same regression that also includes the full set of production(-time)
and HQ-destination(-time) fixed effects. The most impressive coeffi-
cients relate to the home dummies. They point to very large advantages
of producing where the markets are (first column), and for operating an
assembly plant in the same country where the brand is headquartered.
For both variables, the revealed effects on market share are very large:
Sales in a OECD market are 4 times larger ( =exp(1.45) 4.2) if the car is
assembled locally, and 16 times larger when the production country is
also the HQ country. The corresponding home “premia” for LDCs are 29
and 42. An important point is that these large home effects are present
even though tariffs are controlled for in the regression. Tariffs on
assembled cars have a strong impact on sales. Our elasticity of 9.3 is
reasonably close to the estimates from Arkolakis et al. (2018) (Table 1,
8.4–11.6 in estimations that aggregate over multiple industries), and
Head and Mayer (2019) (Table 3, estimate of 7.7 using brand-level
sourcing decisions that condition on each brand’s set of production
locations). The combination of typically very large tariff rates on as-
sembled cars with this high elasticity and large LDC home coefficients
implies that production has to be local for market shares to be lifted out
of the negligible area in poor countries.
The other τℓn frictions have the usual sign and imply overall that
even outside national borders, proximity is important for market shares
in the car industry. Membership of a regional agreement tends to
double market shares ( =exp(0.79) 2.2) on average (and this effect is on
top of the stimulus to trade from eliminating tariffs). RTA membership
also has large positive effects on the headquarter-assembly country
dimension, but the coefficient is estimated imprecisely. Distance and
contiguity also have noisy estimates in the iℓ dimension but their esti-
mated magnitudes are near zero. In sum, triadic gravity equations yield
results similar to conventional gravity estimates in the origin-destina-
tion dimension for all the standard determinants, but the only
Table 2
Triadic gravity trade and MP frictions estimates. Dependent variable: {HQ i,
made-in-ℓ} market shares in n.
Trade τℓn MP γiℓ
Home (OECD) 1.454a 2.807a
(0.367) (1.019)
Home (LDC) 3.364a 3.743a
(0.517) (0.855)
ln distance .536a 0.081
(0.11) (0.215)
Contiguity 0.339c 0.063
(0.18) (0.399)
RTA 0.79a 0.589
(0.255) (0.567)
ln (1+tariff) 9. 285a −5.759
(1.024) (6.361)
200,735 observations (21 HQ, 52 assemblers, 76 markets, 17 years). PPML with
ℓt and int fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the assembly-country (ℓ)
level. Significance levels: c: p<0.1, b: p<0.05, a: p<0.01. The squared
correlation between predicted and actual market shares (our measure of fit) is
0.91.
Table 3
Offshoring regressions—Linear regressions.
Sample: All HQ countries Only OECD HQ
definition: Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
ln model price −0.062a −0.217a 0.020 −0.248a
(0.020) (0.025) (0.060) (0.075)
ln model price × ln yit −0.055a −0.124a −0.133a −0.142b
(0.012) (0.016) (0.042) (0.064)
ln brand sales 0.012b 0.022a 0.018a 0.028a
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
ln model sales 0.002 −0.005 0.002 −0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Age of model −0.000 −0.003 −0.001 −0.006c
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Years left to model 0.005b 0.009a 0.007b 0.012a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 12,393 18,701 9045 14,871
R2 0.263 0.320 0.253 0.287
Count of models 1760 2439 1142 1745
Note: Narrow offshoring confines the market to the brand’s home. Broad off-
shoring includes MP in all countries. Brand-clustered standard errors in par-
entheses. Significance levels: c: p<0.1, b: p<0.05, a: p<0.01. Additional
controls not reported here: headquarter-year and segment fixed effects.
13 There are two countries, Brazil and Uruguay, that the estimation drops
because their sole brands (Agrale and Effa, respectively) produce only at home,
thus preventing identification of fixed effects for both brand and location.
14 Head and Mayer (2014) show that the estimator performs well under a
fairly wide range of error term structures. To deal with the large number of FEs,
we use the poi2hdfe estimator provided by Paulo Guimaraes.
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statistically significant determinant of γiℓ is production in the head-
quarter country (home).
We estimate assembly-country effect, FEAℓt separately from the
headquarter-country effects contained in the FESint effects. That is we
would like to know whether cars made in Germany have high market
shares abroad because Germany is a good place to make cars or because
German brands are very strong. There is an analogy with worker and
firm fixed effects used in employer-employee data sets as well as the
“places versus people” issue in economic geography.15 Identification is
impossible without a certain degree of overlap. In the case of workers,
that means one needs either simultaneous dual-job holders or job-
switchers. In labour markets only the latter source of variation is
common. Fortunately, both sources of overlap are amply available in
the car data. The United States as a production country makes Amer-
ican, German, and Japanese brands along with smaller levels of pro-
duction of other brands. Meanwhile, Japanese brands are assembled in
31 different countries. This overlap implies that the FEAs estimate the
cost advantages of assembly countries after purging the influence of the
strong (or weak) brands based in those countries.
Fig. 8 reports our results where for each country we average the
FEAℓt and FESint obtained from the estimation of Eq. (8). This results in
two bars for each country, the blue one giving the advantage of the
country as an assembly site, and the red one summarizing the strength
of its brands through its position as a headquarters. Italy serves as the
reference country in both cases which is why it is set to zero. Bars are
sorted from the country implied to have the lowest costs (South Korea)
to the one with the highest costs (Egypt).
Korea, Germany, Japan and the United States all rank highly as both
as assembly sites and as headquarters of high performance brands. The
UK is revealed to be a better production place than the US, but the
brands originating there are estimated to be weak. This may seem
surprising if one thinks of Jaguar, Aston Martin, etc. compared to
Chevrolet, Plymouth, etc. However, the regression identifies a strong
brand based on its sales volume performance when produced in mul-
tiple countries. The UK brands generally obtain low market shares when
assembled abroad. The luxury brands from the UK are further penalized
by the fact the dependent variable is measured in quantity, rather than
value, shares.
Emerging economies such as Malaysia or Russia perform negatively
on both metrics. Romania is an interesting case since the regression
reveals it to be a quite bad location for assembling cars. In 2016, there
were two assembly plants in Romania. One assembled Dacias and re-
badged some of them as Renaults (the owner of Dacia). A second plant
made Fords. Therefore our regression identifies the FEA for Romania
based on the relatively bad performance of Fords and Renaults as-
sembled in Romania compared to other production locations for those
brands.
5.2. Model-level measure of skill intensity
To measure the model-specific skill intensity, we rely on informa-
tion about relative prices. The idea is that high skill intensity requires
greater use of workers who command higher wages (engineers, etc.).
Our theory implies that with constant markups over marginal costs,= +p m z mln ( ) ( ) constant. Thus skill intensity rises linearly with
log price. This suggests that we want to obtain a market and time-in-
variant component of prices since we do not think skill-intensity varies
in those dimensions. We therefore need to purge prices, ln pm, of the
destination and time shocks. This is especially important because there
are large destination n-level price effects. For example, a given model is
generally much more expensive in Denmark than in other countries. We
have 81,727 observations of ln pmnt for a set of 1777 models and 28
destinations markets. Therefore we run a two-dimension fixed effects
regression:= + +pln FEM FENmnt m nt mnt (9)
With 14 years and 28 countries, there would in principle be 392 des-
tination-years with a full data set. However, the price data is much
more sparse. The maximum is 268 with a mean of 46, and a median of
nine. The minimum is two.
We define pln FEM^ mean(FEM^ )m m m as the deviation of the
model fixed effect from the mean across all models. This normalization
is useful because it allows us to interpret the base effects in regression
specifications with interactions.
The fixed effects used to estimate ln pm are available for 1145 brand-
model combinations. For the 1073 remaining distinct brand-models
that do not have fixed effects, we use the average within the brand for
the segment (14 function-size-price segments identified using Polk). For
brands that are not represented in a given segment we use the average
for all the models in that segment.
6. Estimates of offshoring probability equation
We use log per capita income, ln yit, as the proxy for the relative
abundance of skill and capital in accordance with the model. The
coefficient of chief interest in these regressions is the interaction of skill
Fig. 8. The best assembly and HQ countries for cars.
15 See Abowd et al. (1999) on the former and Gibbons et al. (2014) on the
latter.
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abundance with skill intensity, that is: ln yit× ln pm. Our theory predicts
a negative effect for this interaction term so long as the proxies are
valid. These proxies receive support from the Schott (2004) finding that
high income countries have comparative advantage in high-price vari-
eties within each goods classification.
Combining the proxies for general assembly cost advantage with the
interaction term representing model-specific comparative advantage,
Eq. (4) becomes
= + + ++ × + y pp yoffs ( FEA
^ ln(^ ^ ) ln ln
(ln ln ) ),
m i t it it it it m
m it
( ) 1 2 3 4
5 (10)
where the “⋅⋅⋅” represent additional offshoring determinants that we
adopt from the literature. Since the FEA and interaction terms are both
increasing in the home’s advantages, the effects of offshoring prob-
abilities are negative, i.e. we expect β1< 0 and β5< 0.
The dependent variable in the narrow-definition offshoring regres-
sion specification is the fraction of i-brand, model m sales in i assembled
in a country with 20% lower per capita income than i. Broad offshoring
down is the fraction of i-brand, model m world-wide sales assembled in
countries with 20% lower per capita income.16
6.1. Linear probability model (LPM) results
The first three terms in Eq. (10) are country-time specific. This
implies that we can use of fixed effects for the headquarter country to
capture them. The attraction of this approach is that we no longer need
to rely on the estimated proxies from the triadic gravity equation. In
this case, it is still possible to estimate the effects of ln pm, our proxy for
the skill intensity of the model, and its interaction with income per
capita, our measure of skill abundance. The drawback with this speci-
fication is that many of those fixed effects are perfect predictors of
whether or not to offshore. Since the coefficients in linear regressions
on binary dependent variables are usually very close to the average
marginal effects obtained by logit or probit regressions, we run a first
set of linear probability model (LPM) regressions.17
The first two columns of Table 3 keep offshoring decisions in-
dependently of where the model is headquartered, whereas the last two
columns limit the sample to OECD countries. In each of those samples,
we further distinguish between narrow and broad offshoring. A first
result is that high-priced models are less likely to be offshored, espe-
cially when the broad definition is applied, in which case a doubling of
the price results in a drop of the probability of offshoring to a lower-
wage country by about 15 percentage points ( × =0.217 ln(2) 0.15).
This is the effect for an average income country ( =yln 0i ). Our main
variable of interest is the interaction between the price of the model and
income per capita. For a country with twice the average income in our
sample, the impact of doubling a variety’s price expand to a 21 per-
centage point reduction. This supports our hypothesis that rich coun-
tries have a comparative advantage in skill-intensive models, which
results in a lower propensity to source those from abroad as income
rises.
6.2. Fractional logit results
The linear offshoring specification does not take into account that
offshoring fractions cannot exceed one or fall below zero. Table 4 shows
that in the vast majority of cases the offshoring fraction is zero or one,
i.e. at the boundaries of the permissible range, which suggests we
should estimate a binary choice model such as logit (or probit). The
logit also allows the marginal effects to depend on the probability of
offshoring. Since Table 4 shows that 1.44% (narrow definition) and
15% (broad definition) of offshoring fractions lie between 0 and 1, we
use fractional logit as our estimation method rather than standard logit,
which expects a truly binary dependent variable.
Under this specification, offshoring of model m in year t is a function
of two variables obtained from the triadic gravity equation, which re-
places the headquarter-year fixed effects: FEA^ it and ln(^ ^ ),it it with i^t and
i^t being calculated as the average of the predicted bilateral frictions
using coefficients from Table 2. As in the linear specification, ln pm, and
its interaction with ln yit are estimated, and the omission of head-
quarter-time effects also allows identification of ln yit. Additional ex-
planatory variables are included to capture scale effects (worldwide
sales of model and brand) and vintage effects (age of model and years
left in program). We also include function-size-price segment dummies
and year dummies.
Table 5 provides our estimates of the fractional logit regressions.
Columns (1)–(3) consider all models, whereas the last two columns
eliminate models associated with 110 non-OECD (mainly Chinese)
brands. The first specification is a linear model, which we use as a
starting point because it can be compared to the first column of Table 3.
We then move to our preferred fractional logit results in column (2). In
both the linear and the logit specifications, the assembly cost advantage
of the headquarter country strongly reduces the likelihood of off-
shoring.
The interaction between price and income is negative as expected in
both the linear and logit regressions. The linear coefficient, 0.029 is
somewhat smaller (in absolute value) than it was in the specification
with country-year fixed effects ( 0.055). The interpretation of inter-
action terms is complicated by the non-linearity of the logit model.18
The best way to understand these effects is through graphical display.
The marginal effects (evaluated from the 1st to 99th percentiles) of
model price and income are displayed in Fig. 9. In panel (a) we see that
for low income countries the marginal effect of a higher price is near
zero. This is telling us that poor countries are unlikely to offshore any
models, regardless of their price. This fact is illustrated in Fig. 10 where
we see the model predicts and the data depicts the absence of offshoring
by poor countries.
The marginal effect of a higher price remains near zero until rela-
tively high levels of GDP per capita are achieved. For countries with
incomes over that of Spain in 2016, the marginal effect becomes sig-
nificantly negative. For the highest income HQ countries (USA, Sweden,
and Australia in 2016), increasing the price by 10% decreases the
likelihood of offshoring by 1.5 percentage points. This should be seen as
a substantial effect given that the average probability of offshoring is
just seven percent. The histogram of per capita incomes shown below
the marginal effects in Panel (a) reveals that most of the models in our
sample are produced in countries whose incomes are high enough to
yield significantly negative marginal effects of price.
Panel (b) of Fig. 9 displays the marginal effects of higher income
Table 4
Offshoring fractions: narrow vs broad.
Fraction of Model-years offshored Home sales World sales
Count Percent Count Percent
All 1627 8.7 5866 31.37
Majority 99 .53 887 4.74
Minority 170 .91 1864 9.97
None 10497 56.13 10084 53.92
n/a* 6308 33.73
* n/a occurs under the narrow definition of offshoring because of model-years
not sold in the home market of the model’s brand.
16 Note that both the numerator and the denominator of broad offshoring are
defined more expansively.
17 This also facilitates comparison with McCalman and Spearot (2013), who
estimate a linear specification along these lines. 18 See Ai and Norton (2003) for a fulsome discussion.
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conditional on model price. There are large positive effects for in-
expensive cars and zero effects for very expensive cars. The switchover
point from positive to negative effect occurs at the price level of a BMW
X1 or Subaru Outback (ln pm≈0.5). As the histogram below panel (b)
indicates, higher income countries are more likely to engage in off-
shoring for the vast majority of the models in our sample.
Fig. 10 shows that the estimated model can predict national rates of
offshoring reasonably well. Offshoring in the data by the historical
brand headquarters (France, Italy, UK, Germany, Japan, and USA) are
all fairly close to their predicted levels. There are two prominent
deviations from the predicted offshoring rate that turn out to be based
on single brands. Seat (a subsidiary of Volkswagen) is the only Spanish
brand. Our regressions predict it should offshore very little and indeed
the models from which it derives most sales (Ibiza and Leon) are as-
sembled in Spain. However, Seat offshores four models that it sells in
tiny amounts. Australia is an even more glaring case of the regression
under-predicting the rate of offshoring. Again there is only a single
domestic brand which is owned by a large foreign firm. In this case,
General Motors was phasing out the manufacturing activity of Holden
over the estimation period. On 20 October 2017, Holden closed its last
Australian plant, although the brand continues as an importer of ve-
hicles (that is, offshoring rises to 100% in 2018).
6.3. Other determinants of offshoring
Our discussion of results in the two previous subsections focuses on
the two chief hypotheses about offshoring, general cost advantages in
assembly and model-specific comparative advantage. We now discuss
the controls that we added to the specification.
Our regressions incorporate dummies for the market “segment” of
each model. We classified all models into 14 segments based on three
categorical variables provided by IHS:
Table 5
Offshoring regressions (fractional logit).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method: OLS Fractional logit
Sample: All HQ countries Only OECD HQ
Definition: Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
HQ comp. adv. (FEA^ it) −0.036
b −0.610a −0.210 −0.603a −0.340b
(0.014) (0.213) (0.138) (0.216) (0.151)
frictions (ln ^ ^it it) −0.018 −2.330
c −0.347 −2.425c −0.293
(0.025) (1.209) (0.220) (1.299) (0.425)
ln yit 0.056b 3.644a 1.223a 3.289a 0.363
(0.024) (1.209) (0.210) (1.155) (0.294)
ln model price −0.012 0.649 −1.347a −0.052 −1.983a
(0.018) (1.035) (0.268) (1.685) (0.518)
ln model price × ln yit −0.029b −1.802b −0.865a −1.281 −0.507
(0.014) (0.807) (0.262) (1.203) (0.520)
ln brand sales 0.007 0.135 0.250a 0.123 0.242b
(0.007) (0.134) (0.091) (0.134) (0.095)
ln model sales 0.006b 0.068 −0.035 0.072 −0.031
(0.003) (0.057) (0.029) (0.058) (0.031)
Age of model 0.001 −0.002 −0.035c −0.003 −0.035
(0.001) (0.039) (0.021) (0.041) (0.023)
Years left to model 0.006b 0.092a 0.051b 0.090a 0.062b
(0.003) (0.033) (0.026) (0.034) (0.026)
Observations 11,796 11,796 18,076 9039 14,864
R2 0.106 0.243 0.310 0.228 0.288
Count of models 1726 1726 2405 1142 1745
Note: Narrow offshoring confines the market to the brand’s home. Broad off-
shoring includes MP in all countries. Brand-clustered standard errors in par-
entheses. Additional controls not reported here: year, segment. Significance
levels: c: p<0.1, b: p<0.05, a: p<0.01.
Fig. 9. Marginal effects of interacting comp. adv. factors.
Fig. 10. Offshoring is for the rich.
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• Function/usage (SUV, MPV, sport car, etc.) referred to in the data
set as “Global Sales Sub-segment”• Size categories (A–F), measured in length, but relative to the cor-
responding functional category. In the data this is called the “Global
Sales Segment.”• Price class: entry/mid-level (1), premium (2), luxury (3). The first
two are defined relative to size and function categories; luxury is a
stand-alone segment. This variable is called the “Global Sales Price
Class.”
We provide some basic information on the 14 segments in Table 6.
The table sorts the segments by an estimate of worldwide sales values in
that segment. The quantities come from our main data set but the
average prices for each segment are estimated based on much more
limited data. We see that segments are very different in size. Thus a firm
can achieve high market share in the “lux” (luxury) category with much
lower volume of sales than in the “midloCar” segment.
The segment-level fixed effects are displayed in Fig. 11, where mid-
sized, low price cars (midlocar) are taken as the benchmark.19 The
dominant feature of this figure is that smaller cars are more offshore-
able. This effect is above and beyond the fact that smaller cars are
cheaper since we have controlled separately for price at the model
level. This could be due to lower shipping costs for smaller cars and
lower import tariffs (which are generally positively associated with
larger engine sizes). Smaller cars may also be less skill-intensive.
We included controls for scale and vintage effects, in part to be able
to compare results to those of McCalman and Spearot (2013). They find
negative variety-level scale effects on offshoring to Mexico. In parti-
cular, trucks produced at above-median scale are less likely to be off-
shored. We cannot think of any microeconomic underpinnings for di-
chotomizing scale and therefore measure it as log world-wide sales (in
units) of the model. Model-level scale has small and statistically insig-
nificant effects. On the other hand, we find brand-level scale is a po-
sitive predictor of broad offshoring, a result that is consistent with the
mechanism of Helpman et al. (2004).
A second variable for which we can compare results is the “vintage”
of a model. McCalman and Spearot (2013) find that varieties are less
likely to be offshored in their first year of production. The story at-
tached to this result is older varieties are more standardized and
therefore easier to produce far from headquarters. However, recent
work by Hanson (2015) finds a negative relationship between off-
shoring and routinization that pushes in the opposite direction. He ar-
gues that tasks that are routine tend to be easier to automate. When
automation is an option, it appears to dominate offshoring. We find that
model age has an effect that is small and mainly not statistically dif-
ferent from zero. In the two specifications where variety age is mar-
ginally significant, it has a negative effect, more in line with Hanson’s
result.
Car model designs are referred to in our data as “programs.” Since
they have different durations we can separate the age of a model from
the number of years left in the program. While age has essentially no
effect, there are systematically positive and significant effects of “years
left” on the offshoring decision. The natural interpretation for such
effects is that it is easier to recover the fixed costs of offshoring for
models with longer lifespans.
Our price results are quite different from McCalman and
Spearot (2013). They find that only price residuals matter and they
enter negatively. Our data lacks the features of models that might be
used to estimate price residuals. However, we find that prices them-
selves have negative impacts on offshoring, provided the per-capita
income of the home country is high enough.
An important finding of McCalman and Spearot (2013) is that
complexity reduces offshoring. They measure complexity using varia-
tion in a large vector of features. Our data contains no direct analogue
for this measure. However, we conjecture that if we did have variation
in features, it would be higher for higher priced and larger cars. Hence
our results that higher price varieties and larger cars are less likely to be
Table 6
Size of 14 categories (2000–16 totals).
Category Value ($bn) Volume (mn) Price($th) Brands(#)
midloCar 7794.68 331.47 23.52 94
bigSUV 5873.86 93.28 62.97 96
smallCar 3610.34 226.78 15.92 97
smallSUV 3309.28 98.36 33.64 99
midhiCar 1592.46 46.3 34.39 23
bigMPV 1537.79 40.44 38.03 53
smallMPV 1512.37 65.77 22.99 55
bigmedCar 1379.55 26.61 51.83 26
bighiCar 405.74 3.53 115.03 11
bigloCar 327.84 10.32 31.77 34
midSport 256.18 7.16 35.77 25
bigSport 234.97 2.68 87.56 24
smallSport 83.04 3.18 26.09 23
lux 74.53 .33 228.98 16
Fig. 11. Segment-level effects of offshoring rates.
19 As can be seen in Table 6, midlocar is the by far largest segment by volume.
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offshored could arise in part from their greater complexity.
McCalman and Spearot (2013) have data on US and Mexico only so
they cannot estimate the role of country-specific “assembly advantage”
as we do here. Also they cannot estimate the interaction between
country development and model prices. Furthermore, as their data set
has sales in Canada and US only, they cannot calculate our “broad”
measure of offshoring.
To sum up, we find that controls for variety age and scale have very
little effect on the decision to offshore. The variables that do seem to
promote offshoring are small size, brand scale, and years left for the
model’s design. Taken as a whole, however, the controls do not affect in
a material way the key results of our paper, namely that richer coun-
tries tend to offshore low-end cars. To establish this, we reproduced
Fig. 9 without any of the additional controls. As can be seen in Fig. 12,
the structure of the marginal effects remains the same. For per capita
incomes over that of Spain, higher priced cars are less likely to be
offshored. Moreover, for models less expensive than the Subaru Out-
back, a rise in income significantly raises the propensity to offshore.
7. Conclusion
Offshoring assembly to lower wage countries is growing in the car
industry. Under the broad definition comprising all car assembly in
lower income countries, offshoring has risen from 20% (in 2000) to
40% of global production. However, because of tariff and large esti-
mated non-tariff barriers, we find this form of offshoring is mostly
motivated by the need to produce locally to serve LDC markets. Under
our narrow definition that considers only cars assembled in low wage
countries to be sold at home, the amount of offshoring is quite limited,
accounting for just eight percent of the home country’s market.
Furthermore, the lower wage countries in question generally do not
include the countries best known as offshoring sites for other industries.
Car makers assemble in China mainly for the Chinese market. When
making cars for the home or third-country markets, the preferred as-
sembly locations appear to be Mexico (for serving the North American
market) and the Eastern European countries that entered the European
Union in 2004. The other sense that offshoring is limited is that it is
highly concentrated among a few firms. The top five brands in any
given year account for about half of narrow offshoring.
Our triadic gravity regressions estimate a substantial double penalty
of offshoring: γ frictions give a cost disadvantage to factories outside the
home country and τ frictions add further costs on the cars when they are
imported back into the home market. The only force militating in fa-
vour of offshoring by the narrow definition is comparative disadvantage
at home. We therefore hypothesize that comparative advantage should
play a major role in determining why some models are offshored and
others not. We find that estimates of HQ country cost advantage in car
assembly are strong negative predictors of narrow offshoring but have
weaker effect on broad offshoring. This makes sense given that broad
offshoring undoubtedly includes much production abroad that is or-
iented towards market access in the host country.
Looking within countries we find that low-price models from high-
income countries are the most likely to be offshored. A traditional
Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation of this result is that price is acting as
proxy for skill intensity and per capita income is a proxy for relative
skill abundance. Alternatively, it could be that high price is measure of
quality, which high income countries have a comparative advantage in
supplying. Prices also capture markups, of course. There is a wide-
spread intuition that low markups and competition “force” low-margin
varieties to be offshored. However, a cost minimizing firm should still
want to produce its high-markup models in the low-cost location. Hence
we prefer the interpretation that cross-product variation in offshoring is
mainly driven by misfit between variety-level factor intensity and factor
abundance in the headquarter country. This view conforms with the
conclusion that Hanson (2015) draws from comparing offshore as-
sembly rates across sectors: “a narrative with strong Heckscher-Ohlin
plot lines seems to tell much of the story of changes in global produc-
tion sharing. It may require much richer industry data to find other
determinants at work.” The striking result of our paper is that when
using the very rich data on global car assembly, we again find a pattern
of offshoring that can be well-explained by invoking Heckscher-Ohlin
forces.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at 10.1016/j.jjie.2019.02.005.
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